Native News
Cyberwar: An Evolving Threat
Guest Opinion
Cyberwar is nothing new, but we may be seeing a new version of it. Recent outages in transportation, financial services and other online platforms may be the result of failing infrastructure when AI/SI is used to run it, but they also remind us of what can happen in a cyberwar.
We have been planning for cyberwar since at least 2007, when Russia used cyberattacks against Estonia, and again against Georgia in 2008 as a prelude to a ground attack. NATO led the development of a manual based on international law, humanitarian law and the laws of war as they apply to cyberwar. The first edition was published in 2013, followed by a second edition in 2017. But will it stand the test of time as the threat of cyberwar continues to evolve?
A Short History of the Law of Cyberwar
The Tallinn Manual was developed by a group of international cybersecurity lawyers, government officials and military personnel following the attacks on Tallinn, Estonia, by Russia in 2007. The Russians again attacked Georgia in 2008 as a prelude to the ground operation that followed. The Tallinn Manual is now in its second edition and is used as nonbinding legal guidance to analyze cyberattacks and determine when, and what kind of, response is permissible under international law.
The problem with international legal guidance is that it consists of interpretations provided by scholars and practitioners and is not, in itself, binding law. However, diplomatic pressure remains the most effective way to enforce these guidelines. The world’s biggest cyberattacker is China, which tends to deny responsibility, along with the second-largest cyberattacker, Russia. Cyberattacks must be state-sponsored to fall under the laws of war and the guidance of the Tallinn Manual. When individuals are identified as responsible for attacks and reported to their home countries, the response is often surprise or a promise to investigate.
Diplomatic pressure is much harder to apply when those responsible are not exposed to the world. Sometimes, however, attacks become public, as in the Sony Entertainment hack by North Korea. The cyberattack was retaliation for the 2014 movie The Interview, which depicted an assassination plot involving North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong Un.
Countries seeking asymmetric warfare and deniability develop their own “armies” of cyberattackers. Using the term hacktivists tends to suggest that these individuals are civilians, but they are likely supported by their countries, usually China, Russia, North Korea, Iran and sometimes Syria. Many of these cyberattack groups claim to be associated with their respective countries, while their governments deny any knowledge of their activities.
These countries’ cyberattackers are making hundreds of thousands of strikes a day against government resources and the private sector in hopes of gaining information or disabling our critical infrastructure.
Absent other effective responses to cyberattacks under international law, the United States has resorted to the only legal strategy available to us: using our own domestic criminal laws to prosecute cyberattacks that fall within U.S. jurisdiction. When we can identify individual cyberattackers, we issue an Interpol Red Notice, which alerts member countries to seek the arrest of an individual, and file a complaint in federal court. We have done this on numerous occasions, but the chances of one of these hackers leaving China or Russia for a vacation outside their home countries, where they might be identified and arrested in transit, are highly unlikely.
Some Round-Peg-in-Square-Hole Problems
Government-supported hackers in China, North Korea and Russia are not typical combat soldiers. International law requires combatants to identify themselves with insignia and uniforms, but we have no real equivalent for a hacker working in an office. Cyberattacks can go unattributed because the attacker obviously conceals their identity. International law generally requires attribution of an attack before the targeted nation can respond with kinetic force, such as bombs or other military counterattacks. Defensive measures are legal under international law, but that stops short of offensive attacks or retaliation.
The closest we came to seeing attribution may have been when North Korea appeared to take credit for the Sony Pictures attack on the eve of the release of its comedy about the North Korean supreme leader. North Korea praised the attack while also denying responsibility. That denial made attribution all but impossible.
Even when an attack can be attributed to an individual cyberattacker, as in the case of Iranian hackers identified as the perpetrators of attacks against a water system in Rye, New York, that is still not sufficient to attribute responsibility to the nation itself. State attribution is generally required to trigger an international response against that nation. In an indictment unsealed in 2016 involving Iranian hackers accused of cyberattacks against the U.S. financial industry in 2011 and 2012, the individuals were charged under U.S. domestic law in the Southern District of New York. Nations typically respond by saying they were unaware of the attack but will address it promptly as a domestic crime.
Final Thoughts
We may be seeing a new version of cyberwar through the use of AI/SI to design cyberwarfare weapons that go beyond the old distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks that inspired the Tallinn Manual. The next edition of the Tallinn Manual should address these round-peg-in-square-hole problems.
To read more articles by Professor Sutton go to: https://profvictoria.substack.com/
Professor Victoria Sutton (Lumbee) is a law professor on the faculty of Texas Tech University. In 2005, Sutton became a founding member of the National Congress of American Indians, Policy Advisory Board to the NCAI Policy Center, positioning the Native American community to act and lead on policy issues affecting Indigenous communities in the United States.
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